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Abstract
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an
alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that
when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and that they also pool their R&D e¤orts so as to fully
internalize the spillover e¤ects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope
of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries
decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D.
Finally, in the third stage, each country decides its level of emissions non-cooperatively.
For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our …ndings show that
the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as the coalition information exchange decreases until that a minimum
participation consisting of three countries is reached. We also …nd that the grand coalition is stable if the countries sign an international research joint venture but in this case
the e¤ectiveness of the agreement is very low.
Keywords: International environmental agreements; R&D investment; Technology
spillovers; Coalition information exchange; Research joint ventures
JEL Classi…cation System: D74, F53, H41, Q54, Q55
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1

Introduction

Climate change is becoming an important issue in human lives. Due to the absence of
a supra-national authority that can enforce environmental policies to control greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions on a global scale, countries have had to negotiate an international
environmental agreement (IEA), the Kyoto Protocol, to address this problem. The aim of
the Kyoto Protocol is to achieve a reduction in GHG emissions of 5% taking as reference
the level of 1990 for countries of Annex B in the commitment period 2008-2012. However,
there are many doubts about the possibilities of reaching the target of abating GHG emissions for that period. Limited coverage and moderate emission reductions requirements
are two limitations that can reduce the e¤ectiveness of the agreement. Moreover, there
is increasing uncertainty about whether there will be any follow-up after 2012.
Because of the doubts about the e¤ectiveness of an emission agreement as the Kyoto
Protocol, several scholars have asked whether other types of agreements can be designed
to achieve large reductions of GHG emissions. One idea would be to focus on technology improvements in order to reduce abatement costs, as this might increase a country’s
willingness to undertake signi…cant emission reductions. For example, it could be bene…cial to supplement a Kyoto-type agreement with technology elements if technological
development depends not only on a country’s own R&D investment but also on R&D
by other countries through cross-country technology spillovers, see for instance, Carraro
and Siniscalco (1997) and, more recently, Lessmann and Edenhofer (2011). Even with
no explicit agreement on emissions, a technology agreement leading to increased R&D in
clean technologies, and thus to lower abatement costs, might yield a reduction in emissions. This is the argument behind the proposals of a climate agreement on technology
development, see for instance, Buchner and Carraro (2004) and Barrett (2006).1
1

There are several international proposals to promote climate-technology R&D, such as the Carbon

Sequestration Leadership Forum (with 21 member countries plus the European Commission), the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (17 countries plus the European Commission) and the
ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) project, although the ITER project cannot
see exclusively as a climate-technology R&D project. An overview of technology-oriented agreements
stressing their potential role in addressing the free-riding incentives in climate negotiations can be found
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The aim of the present paper is to examine international cooperation on technological
development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions.
Cooperation on technological development may be designed in several ways. This paper
follows the approach adopted by Kamien et al. (1992) in their analysis of the e¤ects of
R&D cartelization and research joint ventures on oligopolistic competition and assumes
that when countries cooperate they coordinate their R&D activities so as to minimize the
agreement costs of controlling emissions and they also share R&D investments and avoid
duplication of R&D activities. In other words, when countries cooperate they pool their
R&D e¤orts so as to fully internalize the spillover e¤ects of their investment in R&D.2
In order to analyze these issues, a parametric version of the model proposed by Heal
and Tarui (2010) to analyze investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities is employed. In the model, abatement costs are assumed to depend
both on the level of abatement and the technology level of the country and environmental
damages are assumed to be linear. We analyze the formation of an IEA as a three-stage
game. In the …rst stage, countries decide on their participation in the agreement. Then,
in the second stage, signatories select investment in R&D to minimize the total costs of
the parties to the agreement and fully internalize the spillover e¤ects of their investments,
whereas non-signatories act unilaterally. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides
its level of emissions non-cooperatively.
Our …ndings show that for the interior solution of the game, signatories invest more in
R&D than non-signatories even if signatories fully internalize the spillover e¤ects of their
investments in R&D. The consequence is that the signatories’investment costs are larger
than the non-signatories’ investment costs and hence the total costs are also larger for
in de Coninck et al. (2008).
2
The idea that the degree of spillovers is di¤erent among countries which cooperate than among
countries which do not cooperate can be also found in Xepapadeas (1995) and Carraro and Siniscalco
(1997). In Xepapadeas (1995), it is assumed that when all countries enter into an international agreement,
the level of technology is common to all countries (it is a perfect public good). Carraro and Siniscalco
(1997) normalize to zero the spillover e¤ects for non-signatories. The present paper assumes that spillover
e¤ects are positive for non-signatories and are fully internalized for signatories so that the level of
technology becomes imperfect public good.
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signatories. Moreover, there are positive externalities for non-signatories stemming from
cooperation, i.e. cooperation decreases the total costs of non-signatories. Then, if one
country abandons the grand coalition, its total costs decrease because the reduction in
investment costs more than compensates the increment in environmental damages caused
by the increase in global emissions, which makes the grand coalition unstable. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the participation in an IEA increases as the spillover
e¤ects decrease although the membership upper bound is of six countries regardless of
the number of countries involved in the environmental problem. Thus, spillover e¤ects
play against cooperation, but even with low spillover e¤ects is not possible to achieve a
stable agreement consisting of more than six countries. Notice that the lower the spillover
e¤ects the larger the asymmetry in terms of information exchange between signatories
and non-signatories. In fact, when spillover e¤ects increase the stable agreement converges to the result of the standard model with quadratic abatement costs and linear
environmental damages: only three countries participate in the IEA. The conclusion is
that sharing information is not a su¢ cient condition to achieve a large membership in
a technology agreement so that this type of agreement does not appear as a good alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. The problem is that
the asymmetry between signatories and non-signatories is not su¢ cient to eliminate the
incentive the countries have to act as free riders when they cooperate in the provision of
an (imperfect) public good, the e¤ective investment. To check this hypothesis we have
studied an international research joint venture (IRJV) that only obliges signatories to
share information. The result of our research is that the grand coalition is the unique
IRJV regardless of the degree of spillovers and the number of countries involved in the
environmental problem. Thus, sharing information plays for participation but cooperating in deciding the level of investment plays against participation and, in fact, practically
eliminates all the positive e¤ects of the coalition information exchange. Unfortunately,
we can not neither to present an IRJV as an alternative to an emission agreement because
its e¤ectiveness is low. Sharing information stimulates participation but at the cost of
getting a low percentage of the potential gains coming from cooperation.
Although the literature on IEAs is very extensive, only a few theoretical contributions
5

have addressed the issue studied in the present paper. The …rst paper worth commenting
on is Carraro and Siniscalco (1997). They employ a numerical example to show that
one possible way of overcoming the free-rider incentive is to link the unstable emission
agreement with information exchange on technology development. The timing of their
model is as follows: …rst, the government decides whether or not to cooperate; then, given
this decision, signatories impose cooperatively the emission target and an exogenously
given degree of spillovers on …rms, and non-signatories act in a non-cooperative way;
…nally, polluting …rms decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively R&D investment and
production. Each …rm is assumed to be located in a di¤erent country and all …rms are
supposed to sell to in a non-competitive, single global market. An important feature of
the model is that the …rm’s innovation e¤ort a¤ects both the economic and environmental
technology. Thus, the technology agreement involves to share information about R&D
investment that reduce emissions and production costs.
A second interesting paper to comment is Barrett (2006) that shows that breakthrough
technologies cannot improve the performance of international environmental agreements
with the exception of breakthrough technologies that exhibit increasing returns to scale.3
Barrett (2006) studies a system of two treaties, one promoting R&D and the other encouraging cooperative adoption.4 First, countries participate in a R&D investment treaty.
In this …rst stage, each country decide to invest in R&D to develop new technology. In
a second stage, countries decide whether or not to participate in a technology adoption
agreement which implies the complete elimination of emissions. In a third stage, signatories decide collectively whether to adopt the new technology that is a public good.
Finally, non-signatories decide individually whether to adopt the new technology. The
3

A breakthrough technology opens the possibility of GHG emissions being completely eliminated, i.e.,

fossil fuels could be completely replaced by other non-polluting energies. See Barrett (2009) for a survey
of the possibilities of developing these kinds of technologies and Strand (2007) for a study of the e¤ects
of a breakthrough technology treaty on the extraction path of fossil fuels.
4
Urpelainen (2012) studies the strategic design of technology funds for climate cooperation between
industrialized and developing countries when the success of innovation is uncertain. However, he does not
address the issue of participation. Hübler and Finus (2013) consider the possibility of a risky investment
as well but their analysis focuses on North-South technology transfers.
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model yields a standard result of the linear models: membership can be large but only
when the treaty does not make all countries substantially better o¤.5 Our results also
go in the same direction in the sense that our model yields a prediction on participation that converges, for large enough spillovers, to the standard result of the mitigation
models with quadratic abatement costs and linear environmental damages: membership
consists of three countries. Thus, in both cases a technology agreement does not seem
a good alternative for solving the problem of the low participation in an emission agreement that predicts the theoretical models because in both cases the public good feature
of investment in R&D yields an incentive to act as a free rider that reduces participation.
More recently, Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) show that a focus on the R&D phase in
the development of breakthrough technologies can change the result obtained by Barrett
(2006). Assuming that the cost of adoption decreases with respect to the level of R&D,
they …nd that even without increasing returns to scale, a technology agreement can yield
better results than those obtained by focusing on abatement targets, although the …rst
best cannot be achieved. This result is obtained when the non-cooperative equilibrium
with full adoption exists and for a di¤erent timing of the game. Hoel and de Zeeuw
(2010) assume that the agreement chooses R&D expenditures after the participation
stage. Hong and Karp (2012) explore a similar idea but in the framework of the standard
model of an IEA formation with linear payo¤. The authors assume that the cost of
abatement decreases with respect to the level of R&D. Moreover, they assume, as in
Barrett (2006), that countries individually decide whether to invest in a public good that
reduces abatement costs before the participation stage. Their …ndings show that using
mixed strategies at the participation stage the standard result mentioned above reverses:
membership can be large but only when the treaty does make all countries substantially
better o¤. Mixed strategies create endogenous risk so that risk aversion increases the
equilibrium probability of participation. In this paper, we extend this research to the
case of quadratic abatement and investment costs but assuming the timing proposed by
Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) and focusing on pure strategies at the participation stage.
5

Ruis and de Zeeuw (2010) give support to this result in the framework of a model with quadratic

investment costs.
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The last theoretical paper we would like to comment is Battaglini and Harstad (2012).
These authors derive optimistic results about the participation from a dynamic game with
investment in green technologies. Their …ndings show that if a complete agreement on
emissions and investments is signed, signatories eliminate the hold-up problem associated
with their investments but in this case most countries prefer to free-ride rather than
participate. However, if an incomplete agreement on emissions is signed, countries face a
hold-up problem every time they negotiate but the free-rider problem can be mitigated
and signi…cant participation is feasible. In their dynamic game participation becomes
attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that avoid the
hold-up problem.6
Finally, we would like to point out that the results obtained from the empirical papers are not conclusive. On one hand, Buchner and Carraro (2004), Kemfert (2004) and
Lesmann and Edenhofer (2011) give support to the idea that supplementing an emission
agreement with technology elements or replacing an emission agreement with a technology agreement can have positive e¤ects on the participation into the agreement. However, Nagashima and Dellink (2008, 2011) obtain more pessimistic results. Nagashima
and Dellink (2008) address the e¤ects of asymmetric spillovers, that a¤ect the marginal
abatement cost curve, on the participation in an emission agreement. Their results show
that spillovers do not substantially increase the success of IEAs. In their model the size
of the spillovers depend on the state of technology that is exogenously given. More recently, Nagashima et al. (2011) have extended this analysis by relaxing the assumption
of exogenous technological change, but do not consider knowledge spillovers. The results
continue being pessimistic, stable coalitions are smaller when the gains from cooperation
are large.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section speci…es the model. In Section 3,
6

Using a similar dynamic game Harstad (2012) analyzes di¤erent type of agreements with full partici-

pation. Harstad (2012) considers agreements that can be complete or incomplete with di¤erent durations
and taking also into account the possibility of renegotiations. Another contribution using dynamic games
is Urpelainen (2010) although this author focuses on the compliance of an IEA. In particular, he studies
whether technological standards can help to enforce an IEA.
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the fully non-cooperative equilibrium is calculated and in Section 4 the e¢ cient outcome.
Section 5 presents the analysis of a R&D agreement and Section 6 the analysis of an
international research joint venture. The conclusions drawn from this research are detailed
in Section 7.

2

The Model

We develop a static model with N countries that pollute the atmosphere and negotiate the
control of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, taking into account the e¤ects of spillovers
in R&D from one country to another. It is assumed that the e¤ective investment in
a country i; yi ; i = 1; ::; N; depends on the amount invested in R&D in that country,
xi ; to develop clean technologies and also the investments in R&D undertaken in all
other countries. However, technological di¤usion is not perfect, only part of the R&D
investments undertaken in other countries is bene…cial for country i: Hence, the e¤ective
investment of country i is given by
yi = xi +
where X

i

=

P

j6=i

iX i;

2 [0; 1];

(1)

xj : Moreover, countries can reach larger technological spillovers by

means of appropriate instruments such as technological cooperation. Cooperating countries can allow for patents agreements that provide the other countries in the coalition
with a large share of their own innovative technology or they can sign agreements on
technology transfers and/or joint R&D projects that increase the degree of innovation
spillovers inside the coalition. Following the approach adopted by Kamien at al. (1992),
it is assumed that when countries cooperate they pool their R&D e¤orts so as to fully
internalize spillover e¤ects, which implies that in this case we will assume that
for signatories’investments and

i

=

i

=1

2 (0; 1) for non-signatories’investments. Thus, if

n stands for the number of signatories, s for a signatory country and f for a non-signatory,
the e¤ective investment of signatories is
yjs = X s + X f =

n
X

xsk +

k=1

N
Xn
l=1

9

xfl

!

; j = 1; :::; n;

(2)

whereas, the e¤ective investment for non-signatories is given by (1). If all the countries
sign the technology agreement, the e¤ective investment for signatories is given by
yi = X =

N
X

xj ; i = 1; :::; N;

j=1

as in Kamien et al. (1992) when a RJV is formed or in Xepapadeas (1995) when an international agreement with full participation is signed to control GHG emissions. Following
Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), 1

can be de…ned as the “di¤erential technological

leakage”or the “coalition information exchange.”7
In the absence of any explicit abatement activities, emissions in each country depend
only on the technology level of the country. So, the business as usual emissions (BAU)
for a level of e¤ective investment equal to yi is de…ned as E(yi ) =

yi ; with ;

standing for the emissions associated with the dirtiest technology and

> 0;

representing

emission abatement per each unit invested in clean technologies. According to that, we
can de…ne the abatement of country i as Ai = E(yi )

Ei =

yi

Ei where Ei stands

for the current emissions generated by country i: Thus, abatement costs depend both on
the level of abatement and the level of e¤ective investment. E¤ective R&D investment
reduces abatement costs because it reduces the intensity of emissions in the production
of goods and services for a country. The greater the e¤ective R&D investment, the lower
the ratio of GHG emissions over the GDP of the country and, consequently, the lower
the abatement costs. It is assumed that abatement costs are quadratic
c
c
C(Ai ) = A2i = (
2
2

yi

Ei )2 ; c > 0;

(3)

and that the cost of investing in R&D is also quadratic and given by R(xi ) = rx2i =2,
r > 0:8
7

Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) also assume that the degree of innovation spillovers is larger among

countries which cooperate than among countries which do not cooperate, although they assume that
i

=

2 (0; 1) for signatories’investments and

i

= 0 for non-signatories’investments. In this case, the

coalition information exchange is given directly by ; the degree of spillovers.
8
The assumption that investment costs are quadratic is also used by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997)
and is based on the approach adopted by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) in their study on the
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Finally, in each country environmental damages depend on global emissions, E =
PN

i=1

Ei : Environmental damages are assumed to be linear: D(E) = dE; d > 0. Thus,

the total costs of controlling GHG emissions for the representative country can be written
as follows
c
T Ci = (
2

3

r
Ei )2 + dE + x2i :
2

yi

(4)

Fully Non-Cooperative Equilibrium

The fully non-cooperative equilibrium can be calculated as the equilibrium of a two-stage
game. In the …rst stage, countries decide the level of investment in R&D. In the second
stage they decide about emissions. In both stages, the Nash equilibrium is calculated.
Solving by backward induction, we begin analyzing the equilibrium of the second stage.
For a given technology, the optimal emissions can be calculated by minimizing the
following total cost function
c
min T Ci = (
fEi 0g
2

Ei )2 + dE;

yi

i = 1; :::N;

which yields for the representative country9
c(

yi

Ei ) = d;

where the left-hand side represents marginal abatement costs and the right-hand side
marginal damages. Observe that the marginal abatement costs decrease with the e¤ective
investment. Thus, the emissions level of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium is
Ei =

(5)

yi :

Adding for the di¤erent countries, global emissions are obtained
E=

N
X

Ei = N

Y;

(6)

i=1

cooperation in R&D with spillovers in the context on an oligopoly with cost-reducing R&D opportunities.
Golombek and Hoel (2005) in their study of climate policy under technology spillovers assume linear
investment costs that corresponds to the alternative approach adopted by Kamien et al. (1992) for the
analysis of cooperation in R&D with spillovers. Amir (2000) presents an extensive comparison of these
two well-known R&D models.
9
In order to simplify the notation,

stands for the di¤erence
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(d=c) that it is assumed positive.

where Y is the global e¤ective investment in R&D.
Y =

N
X

yi =

i=1

N
X

(xi + X i ):

(7)

i=1

Next, using (5) and (6), total costs can be written as
T Ci =

d2
+ d(N
2c

r
Y ) + x2i ;
2

(8)

where the …rst term represents abatement costs, the second term stands for environmental
damages and the third term for investment costs.
Now we calculate the equilibrium for the …rst stage of the game as follows
min T Ci =

fxi 0g

d2
+ d(N
2c

r
Y ) + x2i ; i = 1; :::; N;
2

(9)

where Y is given by (7).
Observe that global e¤ective investment in R&D becomes a public good. Any investment made by a country reduces the total costs of all countries because of the reduction
in global emissions. Thus, in the second stage of the game, countries have to decide which
is the provision of a public bad whereas in the …rst stage they have to decide about the
provision of a imperfect public good because of the spillovers.
The …rst-order condition for an interior solution is
@T Ci
=
@xi
where @Y =@xi = 1 + (N

@Y
+ rxi = 0;
@xi

d

1), so that the following condition must be satis…ed
d (1 + (N

1)) = rxi ;

(10)

where the left-hand side represents marginal revenue of investment while the righthand side represents marginal cost. Notice that marginal revenue is equal to marginal
damages, d; multiply by the decrease in global emissions caused by the increase in investment of the country,

(1 + (N

1)) : This reduction depends positively on the degree

of spillovers. Thus, the level of investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium is
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given by10
xnc
i =

d
(1 + (N
r

(11)

1)) :

If we focus on the symmetric solution, the e¤ective investment is
nc
nc
yinc = xnc
i + X i = xi + (N

nc
1)xnc
i = xi (1 + (N

1));

that using (11) yields
yinc =

d
(1 + (N
r

1))2 ;

(12)

while global e¤ective investment is given by
Y nc = N yinc =

dN
(1 + (N
r

1))2 :

(13)

Observe that e¤ective investment increases with marginal damages and spillover effects. Finally, global emissions are now given by11
2

E nc = N

dN
(1 + (N
r

Y nc = N

1))2 ;

(14)

and the total costs by
T Cinc =

d2
+d N
2c

2

dN
(1 + (N
r

2 2

1))2

+

d
(1 + (N
2r

1))2 ;

where the …rst term represents abatement costs, the second term the environmental damages and the last term the investment costs. Simplifying this expression total costs can
be written as
T Cinc = dN
10

d2 (2N 1)
r+
2cr

2

c (1 + (N

1))2 :

(15)

Because of the linearity of environmental damages, there exist for the two stages of the game a

dominant strategy, i.e. optimal emissions and investment of one country are independent of the emissions
and investment of the rest of countries.
11
Notice that emissions are decreasing with respect to marginal damages. Thus, to guarantee an
interior solution for the game, marginal damages must be lower than the upper bound de…ned implicitly
by condition E nc = 0:
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The E¢ cient Solution

In order to characterize the e¢ cient solution, the game is solved again in two stages, but
on this occasion assuming that countries minimize global total costs in both stages. We
begin analyzing the solution of the second stage. Given the technology, countries select
emissions to minimize the global total costs
min

fE1 ;:::;EN g

GT C =

N
X

N
X
c
(
2
i=1

T Ci =

i=1

yi

Ei )2 + dE :

The interior solution to the optimization problem for the representative country is
c(

yi

Ei ) = N d;

where the left-hand side represents marginal abatement costs and the right-hand side
global marginal damages. Observe that for the e¢ cient solution, each country has to
balance its marginal abatement costs with the bene…ts its action has on the rest of
country being the bene…t the reduction in damages caused by the abatement. Thus, the
emissions level of the e¢ cient solution is
Nd
c

Ei =

(16)

yi ;

and global emissions are
E=

N
X

Nd
c

Ei = N

i=1

Y;

(17)

where Y is global e¤ective investment in R&D which is given by12
Y =

N
X

yi =

i=1

N
X

(18)

(xi + X i ):

i=1

Using (16) and (17), total costs for the representative country can be written as
T Ci =
12

d2 N 2
+d N
2c

Nd
c

Y

r
+ x2i ;
2

(19)

We assume that when countries cooperate they pool their R&D investment so as to fully internalize

spillover e¤ects, i.e.

= 1 for the e¢ cient solution.
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where the …rst term represents abatement costs, the second term stands for environmental
damages and the third term for investment costs.
Next, in the …rst stage, countries select the level of investment to minimize the global
total costs of controlling emissions that are given by the following expression
GT C =

N
X

T Ci =

i=1

N
X
i=1

d2 N 2
+d N
2c

d2 N 3
+ Nd N
=
2c

Nd
c

Nd
c

Y

r
+ x2i
2

rX 2
+
x:
2 i=1 i
N

Y

(20)

Now we calculate the equilibrium for the …rst stage as follows
d2 N 3
min GT C =
+ Nd N
fx1 ;::;xN g
2c

Nd
c

rX 2
+
x;
2 i=1 i
N

Y

(21)

where Y is given by (18).
The …rst-order condition for an interior solution is
@GT C
=
@xi
where @Y =@xi = N , because

@Y
+ rxi = 0;
@xi

Nd

= 1 so that the following condition must be satis…ed
dN 2 = rxi ;

(22)

where the left-hand side represents the marginal revenue of investment while the righthand side represents the marginal cost. Observe that for the e¢ cient solution, the marginal revenue of investment depends on global marginal damages, N d; and the reduction in global emissions caused by the increase in investment of one country is given by
N: Thus, the level of investment of the e¢ cient solution is given by
xei =

d 2
N :
r

(23)

If we focus on the symmetric solution, the e¤ective investment is
yie = xei + X e i = N xei =
15

d 3
N ;
r

(24)

while global e¤ective investment is given by
d 4
N :
r

Y e = N yie =

(25)

Notice that investment increases with marginal damages.
Finally, the level of global emissions is now given by13
Nd
c

Ee = N

2

Nd
c

Ye =N

d

r

N 4;

(26)

and the total costs by
T Cie =

d2 N 2
+d N
2c

2

Nd
c

d

r

2 2

N4

+

d 4
N ;
2r

where the …rst term represents abatement costs, the second term the environmental damages and the last term the investment costs. Simplifying this expression total costs of the
e¢ cient solution can be written as
d2 N 2
(r +
2cr

T Cie = dN

2

cN 2 ):

(27)

Next, we compare the e¢ cient outcome with the fully non-cooperative equilibrium.
We begin comparing the e¤ective investment using (12) and (24) that yields
yie

yinc =
=

This di¤erence is positive for

d 3
N
r
d
N3
r

d
(1 + (N
r
(1 + (N

1))2
1))2 :

in the interval [0; 1] since (1 + (N

and its maximum value is N 2 for

1))2 is increasing in

= 1. Clearly, lower than N 3 :

Next, the level of emissions of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (5) is
compared with the level of emissions of the e¢ cient solution given by (16)
Einc

13

Eie =

d
c

yinc

=

d
(N
c

1) +

+
(yie

Nd
+ yie
c
yinc ) > 0:

For the e¢ cient solution emissions are also decreasing with respect to marginal damages. Thus, to

guarantee an interior solution, marginal damages must be lower than the upper bound de…ned implicitly
by condition E e = 0: Comparing this condition with E nc = 0, it is easy to show that the upper bound
de…ned by E s = 0 is lower than the upper bound de…ned by E nc = 0:
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Thus, emissions are larger in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium.
Finally, the total costs of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium given by (15) are
compared with the total costs of the e¢ cient solution given by (27).
T Cinc

T Cie =

d2
r (N
2cr

This di¤erence is positive for
increasing in

1)2 + c

2

N4

(2N

in the interval [0; 1] since (2N

and its maximum value is N 2 (2N

1) for

1))2

:

(28)

1)(1 + (N

1))2 is

1) (1 + (N

= 1. Clearly, lower than N 4 :

The results of comparison are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1 The level of e¤ective investment of the e¢ cient solution is larger than
the level of e¤ective investment of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, while the total
costs and emissions are lower.
Moreover, it is straightforward that the gains coming from cooperation decrease with
respect to the degree of spillovers. In other words, the larger the di¤erential technological
leakage, the larger the distance between the fully non-cooperative equilibrium and the
e¢ cient solution.

5

A R&D Agreement

We say that a technology agreement is formed if the countries pool their R&D investments
so as to fully internalize the spillover e¤ects and they select the level of investment in
order to minimize the agreement costs. The formation of an IEA is modeled as a threestage game. Each game will be described brie‡y in reverse order as the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of this three stage game is computed by backward induction.
Given the level of participation in the agreement and the investment in R&D of all
countries, at the third stage, the emission game, each country simultaneously selects its
own emissions acting non-cooperatively and taking the emissions of all other countries as
given, i.e. we assume that there is no cooperation as regards the selection of the level of
emissions. At the second stage, the R&D investment game, signatory countries coordinate
their R&D activities so as to minimize sum of agreement costs taking as given the R&D
17

investments of non-signatories. As we have just pointed out, the signature of a technology
agreement implies that countries share their R&D investments so as to fully internalize
the spillover e¤ects, so that in this case the e¤ective investment for signatories is given
by (2). Non-signatories choose their investment in R&D acting non-cooperatively and
taking the investments of all other countries as given in order to minimize their own costs
of controlling emissions. Signatories and non-signatories choose their R&D investment
simultaneously. Thus, R&D investments are provided by the partial agreement Nash
equilibrium with respect to a coalition de…ned by Chander and Tulkens (1995). Finally,
it is assumed that at the …rst stage countries play a simultaneous open membership game
with a single binding agreement. In a single agreement formation game, the strategies for
each country are to sign or not to sign and the agreement is formed by all players who
have chosen to sign. As usual the level of participation in the agreement is given by the
stability conditions. Under open membership, any country is free to join the agreement if
interested. Finally, we assume that the signing of the agreement is binding on signatories.
They therefore acquire a commitment to stay and implement the agreement during the
second stage of the game so that full compliance is achieved. The game …nishes when the
emissions subgame is over.

5.1

The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment
Game

In this section, we solve by backward induction stages two and three assuming that in the
…rst stage n countries, with n

2, have signed the agreement. As we have supposed that

there is no cooperation in the emissions game, the total costs supported by all countries
are given by (8) except that now the global e¤ective investment in R&D is given by
Y

=

N
Xn
i=1

=

N
Xn
i=1

yif

+

n
X
j=1

xfi +

yjs

=

N
Xn

(xfi

+ (X

i=1

NX
n 1
l=1

xfl +

n
X
k=1

xsk

f

s

i

+ X )) +

!!

n
X

(X s + X f )

j=1

+

n
n
X
X
j=1

k=1

xsk +

N
Xn
l=1

xfl

!

:

(29)

As non-signatories do not cooperate at this stage, the analysis of the non-signatories
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behavior is identical to that performed in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium except
that Y is now de…ned by (29). Thus, for an interior solution the level of investment for
non-signatories is given again by (11) that is independent of the number of signatories.
For signatories, the choice made by the countries can be represented by the optimization problem (21) except that now N must be substituted by n and Y is de…ned by
(29).
The …rst-order condition for an interior solution is
@AT C
=
@xsj

nd

@Y
+ rxsj = 0;
@xsj

where AT C stands for total cost of the agreement and @Y =@xsj = n + (N

n), so that

the interior solution is de…ned by the following condition14
nd (n + (N

n)) = rxsj :

Comparing this condition with condition (22) that characterizes the optimal level of
investment for the e¢ cient solution, we can see that signatories internalize the external
bene…ts of abatement but only for the countries that belong to the agreement, nd; instead
of N d as in the e¢ cient solution. Moreover, if there is not full cooperation the decrease in
global emissions, (n + (N

n)); caused by the increase in investment of one signatory

is lower than in the e¢ cient solution. Then, the signatories’investment is
xsj =

dn
(n + (N
r

(30)

n);

which is increasing with respect to the participation into the agreement. Moreover, if we
compare the investment done by each type of country using (11) and (30), the following
expression is obtained
xsj
that is positive for n

xfi =
2 and

d
(1
r

) (n2

1) + N (n

1) ;

2 (0; 1). Thus, signatories devote more resources for R&D

than non-signatories for any level of participation.
14

(31)

For n = N; this expression gives the level of investment corresponding to the e¢ cient solution.
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If we focus on the symmetric solution for each type of country, the e¤ective investment
of non-signatories is
yif = xfi + (X f i + X s ) = (1 + (N n
d
=
(1 + (N n 1)) (1 + (N
r

1)) xfi + nxsj
1)) + n2 (n + (N

n)) ;

(32)

and the e¤ective investment for the signatories

yjs = X s + X f = nxsj + (N n)xfi
d 2
=
n (n + (N n)) + (N n) (1 + (N
r

1)) :

(33)

Taking the …rst derivative of e¤ective investment with respect to the number of signatories the following expressions are obtained
d
@yif
=
(1
@n
r
@yjs
d
=
(1
@n
r
that are positive for n

2 and

)(3n2
)(3n2

1) + N (2n

1) ;

) + N (2n

) ;

2 (0; 1). Thus, the e¤ective investment of both

signatories and non-signatories increases with the number of signatories.
Next, we compare the levels of e¤ective investment obtaining that the di¤erence between the signatories’e¤ective investment and the non-signatories’e¤ective investment
is
yjs

yif = (1

This di¤erence is positive for n

)

d
(1
r

)(n3

2 and

2 (0; 1): Then, signatories’s emissions are

1) + N (n2

1) :

lower than non-signatories’emissions since the e¤ective investment of signatories is larger
than the e¤ective investment of non-signatories and both signatories’emissions and nonsignatories’emissions decrease when the participation increases.15
Finally, in order to calculate the total costs, we aggregate the e¤ective investment of
the di¤erent countries to obtain the global e¤ective investment in R&D:
Y = (N
15

n) yif + nyjs ;

(34)

Notice that as there is no cooperation for controlling emissions, emissions are given for (5) for both

types of countries.
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which yields after substituting yif by (32) and yjs by (33)
Y =

d
(N
r

n) (1 + (N

1))2 + n2 (n + (N

n))2 :

(35)

To evaluate the e¤ect of cooperation on global e¤ective investment, we take the …rst
derivative of Y; given by (34), that yields
@Y
=
@n

yif

+ (N

@yif
@yif
s
n)
+ yj + n
:
@n
@n

This derivative is positive since cooperation increases e¤ective investment both for the
signatories and non-signatories and, as we have just showed, the signatories’ e¤ective
investment is larger than the non-signatories’e¤ective investment. Thus, global e¤ective
investment increases with the number of signatories.
Next, global emissions are calculated using global e¤ective investment given by (35),
resulting in
2

E=N

Y =N

r

d

(N

n) (1 + (N

1))2 + n2 (n + (N

n))2 :

(36)

It is immediate to conclude that global emissions decrease as the international cooperation
increases because global emissions are inversely related with global e¤ective investment.
Now, substituting global e¤ective investment given by (35) and investment given
by (11) for non-signatories and by (30) for signatories in (8), the total costs for nonsignatories and signatories are obtained

T Cif =

T Cjs =

2
d
d2
+d N
(N
2c
r
2 2
d
+
(1 + (N 1))2 ;
2r

n)(1 + (N

2
d2
d
+d N
(N n)(1 + (N
2c
r
2 2
d 2
+
n (n + (N n))2 ;
2r
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1))2 + n2 (n + (N

n))2

1))2 + n2 (n + (N

n))2

where the …rst term represents abatement costs, the second term the environmental damages and the last term the investment costs. Simplifying theses expressions total cost can
be written as
T Cif =

2 2

d2
+ dN
2c

T Cjs =

d
2r

d2
+ dN
2c

(2(N

n)

1))2 + 2n2 (n + (N

1)(1 + (N

n))2 ; (37)

2 2

d
2r

2(N

n)(1 + (N

1))2 + n2 (n + (N

n))2 :

(38)

The comparison of the total costs is immediate because we have established above
that signatories invest more resources in R&D. Thus, as the abatement costs and environmental damages are the same, it is the di¤erence in investment that explains the
di¤erence in the total costs. The signatories invest more and support a larger cost for
controlling pollution. Moreover, there are positive externalities for non-signatories stemming from cooperation, i.e. cooperation decreases the total costs of non-signatories. The
incorporation of one country to the agreement reduces global emissions and has no e¤ect
on the non-signatories’investment. The result is a reduction in the cost of the countries
that stay outside the agreement.
The e¤ect of cooperation on signatories’total costs is not so obvious since cooperation
increases signatories’investment. To evaluate this e¤ect we investigate which is the sign
of the …rst derivative of total costs with respect to the number of signatories
@T Cjs
=
@n

2 2

d
r

2(1

)n3 + 3(1

This derivative is positive for n
respect to n for n

)N n2 +

2 and

2

N 2n

(1 + (N

1))2 :

2 (0; 1): The derivative is increasing with

0 and it is easy to check that takes a positive value for n = 2, then

it will be positive for any level of cooperation equal to or larger than two countries.
Thus, the model presents the usual features of an IEA formation game that are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Signatories invest more and pollute less that non-signatories but signatories’ total costs are larger than non-signatories’ total costs. Moreover, cooperation is
pro…table for both signatories and non-signatories.

22

5.2

The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game

In this section, we use stability conditions to investigate which is the level of participation
a technology agreement can achieve. First, we present the de…nition of coalition stability
from d’Aspremont et al. (1983), which has been extensively used in the literature on
international environmental agreements.16
De…nition 1 An agreement consisting of n signatories is stable if T Cjs (n)
for j = 1; :::; n and T Cif (n)

T Cjs (n + 1) for i = 1; :::; N

T Cif (n

1)

n:

The …rst inequality, which is also known as the internal stability condition, simply
means that any signatory country is at least as well-o¤ staying in the agreement as
withdrawing from it, assuming that all other countries do not change their membership
decisions. The second inequality, which is also known as the external stability condition,
similarly requires any non-signatory to be at least as well-o¤ remaining a non-signatory
as joining the agreement, assuming once again, that all other countries do not change
their membership decisions. To check the stability conditions the auxiliary function
(n) = T Cjs (n)

T Cif (n

1) is used: If

(n) = 0 has a unique positive solution and

(n) is increasing around this positive solution, then there is a self-enforcing agreement
given by the greatest natural number on the left of the positive solution to equation
(n) = 0 provided that this number is equal to or lower than N: If we represent this
number by n
~ ; we have that (~
n) is negative and the internal stability condition is satis…ed.
Moreover, as

(n) is an increasing function,

(~
n + 1); where n
~ + 1 is the lowest natural

number on the right of the positive solution to equation (n) = 0; must be positive which
means that T Cjs (~
n + 1) is greater than T Cif (~
n) which according to De…nition 1 means
that an agreement consisting of n
~ countries is also externally stable.17 If N is lower than
16

We avoid to use the term self-enforcing in the de…nition because as has been pointed out by McEvoy

and Stranlund (2009) is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements,
not to enforcing compliance with these agreements once they are signed. Nevertheless, we use this term
in the rest of the paper but clearly understanding that it refers to the stability of the agreement not to
the compliance of the agreement.
17
If the positive solution to (n) = 0 is a natural number. The self-enforcing agreement consists of a
number of signatories equal to the solution to the equation and the internal stability condition is satis…ed
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n
~ ; the grand coalition could be stable provided that

(N ) is negative. If

(n) = 0 has

more than one positive solutions, we could have more than one self-enforcing agreement.
Next, the stability analysis is performed to investigate whether there exists a selfenforcing technology agreement. The result is
Proposition 3 The participation in an IEA increases as the coalition information exchange increases although the membership upper bound is of six countries regardless of
the number of countries involved in the environmental problem.
Proof. In order to prove this result, we write the auxiliary function

(n) using the

expressions of the total costs (37) and (38)
2 2

(n) =

d
(2(N n + 1)
2r
2(N n)(1 + (N

1))2 + 2(n

1)(1 + (N
1))2

n2 (n + (N

1)2 (n

1 + (N

n + 1))2

n))2 ;

that after some manipulations can be written as
2 2

(n) =

d
(1
2r
+ N (n2

)(n3

4n + 2)(n + (N

It is immediate that
n

7 and n2

8n2 + 10n

4)(n + (N
n)) + 2(n

1)2 (1

7 since n3

(n) is positive for n

4n + 2 is positive for n

n))
)2 + (1 + (N

8n2 + 10n

1))2 :

4 is positive for

4 and the other terms are positive for all n:

Thus, no agreement consisting of seven or more signatories is going to satisfy the internal
stability condition. Next, we study the stability of a bilateral agreement. For n = 2; the
di¤erence in costs is
2 2

(2) =

d
2r

which is negative for N
value of

(N 2

10N + 13

2

+ (10N

26) + 13);

9: Thus, the internal stability condition is satis…ed for any

2 (0; 1): In order to evaluate the external stability condition, we need to look

at the sign of

(3) :
(3) =

2

2 2

d

r

((5N

12)

as an equality.
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2

(5N

24)

12):

This expression is negative for

9:18 Thus, as the external

in the interval (0; 1) and N

stability condition requires that (3) be positive, a bilateral agreement cannot be stable.
For an agreement with three countries, the internal stability condition is ful…lled for all
because

(3) is negative as we have just seen. On the other hand, the external stability

condition requires that
(4) =
be positive. Doing

3

2 2

d
2r

(N 2 + 6N

31

2

(6N

(4) = 0; we obtain a critical value for

62)

31)

in the interval (0; 1) de…ned

by the positive root of this equation
(N ; 4) =
such that if

9:325N 31
N 2 + 6N 31

is larger than or equal to (N ; 4); the external stability condition is satis…ed.

Then, an agreement consisting of three countries is stable provided that

is larger than

or equal to (N ; 4): For an agreement with four countries, the internal stability condition
is ful…lled if

is lower than (N ; 4) because then (4) is negative. Moreover, the external

stability condition requires that
(5) =
be positive. Doing now

4

2 2

d

r

((N 2

N

14)

2

+ (N + 28)

(5) = 0; we obtain a critical value for

14)
in the interval (0; 1)

de…ned by the positive root of this equation
(N ; 5) =
such that if

3:275N
N2 N

14
;
14

is larger than or equal to (N ; 5); the external stability condition for an

agreement consisting of four countries is satis…ed. Then, the agreement is stable provided
that (N ; 5) is lower than (N ; 4): It is not complicated to show that this is the case
and therefore we can conclude that an agreement consisting of four countries is stable in
the interval [ (N ; 5); (N ; 4)]: For an agreement consisting of …ve countries the internal
18

We do not investigate the stability of an IEA for N

8 because the focus of the paper is on global

environmental problems that involve a great number of countries.
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stability condition is satis…ed for all

lower than or equal to (N ; 5) because then

(5)

is negative. However, the external stability condition requires that
2 2

(6) =
be positive. Doing

d
((15N 2
2r

70N

45)

2

+ (70N + 90)

(6) = 0, we obtain a critical value for

45)

in the interval (0; 1) de…ned

by the positive root of this equation
(N ; 6) =
such that if

8:59N 45
;
15N 2 70N 45

is larger than or equal to

(N ; 6); the external stability condition for

an agreement consisting of …ve countries is ful…lled. Then, as

(N ; 6) is lower than

(N ; 5) we can conclude that an agreement consisting of …ve countries is stable in the
interval [ (N ; 5); (N ; 6)]: Finally, an agreement consisting of six countries can be stable
if

is lower than or equal to (N ; 6) because the external stability condition is satis…ed

for all : Remember that

(n) is positive for all n

7 regardless of the value of :

In order to illustrate this result, we have calculated the critical values for

when

N = 10: When there are only ten countries involved in the externality the critical values
for

are:

Then if

(N = 10; n = 4) = 0:48;

(N = 10; n = 5) = 0:24;

(N = 10; n = 6) = 0:05:

2 (0; 0:05] and agreement consisting of six countries is stable. However, if

2 (0:05; 0:24] the stable agreement is formed by …ve countries. For values of
interval (0:24; 0:48], the stable agreement consists of four countries. Finally, if

in the
> 0:48;

only three countries can form a stable agreement.
Table I shows the solution of the investment game for di¤erent values of participation.
The selected set of values for parameters yields an interior solution for emissions for both
types of countries. It can be seen that for all n between 1 (the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium) and 10 (the grand coalition), the signatories’investment is larger than the
non-signatories’s investment and that this di¤erence is increasing with membership. The
same occurs with total costs. Moreover, at the aggregate level, total costs and global
emissions decrease as the participation in the agreement increases.
) TABLE I (
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In Table II we have recalculated the example for

= 0:025: According to our results,

the participation increases. In this example from four countries to six. Basically, what
explains the increment in participation is that the reduction in the spillover e¤ects soften
the variations in investments caused by the exit of one country from the agreement. Except for n = f9; 10g; when one country leaves the agreement the reduction in investment
that it achieves when

= 0:025 is lower than when

= 0:25: Thus, when spillover

e¤ects are lower the incentive to act as a non-signatory is reduced because the saving
in investment costs is then smaller. On the other hand, we …nd that the reduction in
spillover e¤ects has the same e¤ects on global emissions. Except for n = f8; 9; 10g; when
one country leaves the agreement the increase in global emissions that the exist causes
when

= 0:025 is lower than when

= 0:025: Thus, when spillover e¤ects are lower the

incentive to act as a non-signatory is augmented because the increment in environmental damages is in this case smaller. But for an interior solution, marginal damages are
low and the …rst incentive dominates the second yielding a larger level of participation.
Thus, although the increase in environmental damages is lower when spillover e¤ects are
lower, the decrease in investment costs is also lower and the net e¤ect, because of the low
marginal damages, is that the exit from the agreement becomes unpro…table for a larger
number of signatories.
) TABLE II (

6

An International Research Joint Venture

In the previous section we have studied a technology agreement for which signatories
select cooperatively their level of R&D investment and also pool their R&D e¤orts so
as to fully internalize spillover e¤ects creating a di¤erential technological leakage with
respect to non-signatories. Nevertheless, this type of agreement does not promote a big
participation: regardless of the size of the di¤erential technological leakage, membership
cannot be larger than six countries. In this section, we want to isolate the e¤ect of
information exchange to have a clear idea of what is the responsibility of the cooperation
in selecting R&D investments on the failure of participation studying an agreement that
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only obliges signatories to share information.

6.1

The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium of the Investment
Game

As signatories do not cooperate at this stage, the analysis of the signatories behavior is
identical to that performed in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium except that global
e¤ective investment is de…ned by (29) which implies that @Y =@xsj = n + (N

n): Then

the condition that characterizes the signatories’optimal investment in an international
research joint venture (IRJV) is
d (n + (N

n)) = rxsj :

Comparing this condition with condition (10) that de…nes the optimal level of investment
for the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, we can see that the di¤erence is only in the
e¤ect that investment of signatories has on global emissions that in the previous condition
is (n + (N

n)); an e¤ect larger than in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium. Then,

the signatories’investment is
xsj =

d
(n + (N
r

n));

(39)

which is increasing with respect to the participation into the agreement. Moreover, if we
compare the investment done by each type of country using (11) and (39), the following
expression is obtained
xsj
that is positive for n

2 and

xfi =

d
(1
r

)(n

1);

2 (0; 1): Thus, signatories devote more resources for

R&D than non-signatories for any level the participation and the di¤erence increases
with the di¤erential technological leakage or coalition information exchange given by
1

and the membership. However, signatories’investment in an IRJV is lower than

in a R&D agreement because each signatory does not take into account the external
marginal revenue that its investment causes in the rest of signatories.
From this point the analysis of the investment game equilibrium follows step by step
the analysis developed in Section 5.1 and leads to same type of results. For this reason,
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we omit it and summarize the results in the expressions of total costs that are used for
the stability analysis
2 2

T Cif =

d2
+ dN
2c

d
2r

d2
+ dN
2c

2 2

T Cjs =

6.2

d
2r

(2(N
2(N

n)

1)(1 + (N

1))2 + 2n(n + (N

1))2 + (2n

n)(1 + (N

n))2 ; (40)
n))2 : (41)

1)(n + (N

The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game

In this section, the stability analysis is performed to …nd out whether there exists a
self-enforcing IRJV. The result of the research is
Proposition 4 The grand coalition is the unique IRJV regardless of the level of coalition
information exchange and the number of countries involved in the environmental problem.
Proof. In order to prove this result, we write the auxiliary function

(n) using the

expressions of the total costs given by (40) and (41)
2 2

(n) =

d
(2(N n + 1)
2r
2(N n)(1 + (N

1)(1 + (N
1))2

(2n

1))2 + 2(n
1)(n + (N

1)(n

1 + (N

n + 1))2

n))2 ;

that after some manipulations yields
2 2

(n) =
Thus

d
(1
2r

(n) is negative for all n

)(n
2 and

1)((1

)(5n

1) + 6 N ):

2 (0; 1): This implies that all the agreement

satisfy the internal stability condition but, on the other hand, as it is explained in Section
5.2 this also means that all the agreements does not satisfy the external stability condition.
Then the only stable IRJV consists of all countries because only the grand coalition is
stable if the internal stability condition is ful…lled.
This result establishes that is only necessary a low degree of asymmetry in terms of
information exchange to do stable the grand coalition. The stability appears in an IRJV
basically because the signatories investment levels are closer to the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium than in the R&D agreement which implies that the reduction in investment
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costs of an exit from the agreement do not compensate the increase in environmental damages. To better understand this argument we have recalculated the numerical example
of Table II for an IRJV. The results appear in Table III.

) TABLE III (
Comparing both tables it can be seen that for both types of agreements, the exit
from the grand coalition implies an important reduction in investment for the country
in percentage terms. Almost 99% in a R&D agreement and 88% in an IRJV but this
di¤erence in eleven percentage points, that in absolute values are 1.976 for an R&D
agreement and 0.176 for an IRJV, is enough to do unpro…table the exit. Notice, that
this occurs even for a small increase in global emissions. An exit from one country from
the grand coalition increases global emissions in less than 1% for an IRJV and in more
than 8% for a R&D agreement. However, an IRJV is stable with full participation and a
R&D agreement is unstable. An exit increases the costs in one case and decreases them
in the other case. Thus, what is explaining the stability of the grand coalition for an
IRJV is the small e¤ect that the reduction of investment has in investment costs and this
occurs because the level of investment for signatories is closer to the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium than when the countries coordinate its levels of investment. Thus, from this
conclusion is inferred that the low participation in a R&D agreement as that studied in
the previous section is explained by the free-rider incentives that appears in the provision
of the global e¤ective investment, a global public good. If countries coordinate their R&D
investment to take into account their external positive e¤ects, the di¤erence in investment
levels with respect to the fully non-cooperative equilibrium creates the incentive to act
as a free-rider of the agreement that appears in the standard models of IEA formation.19
19

Remember that the non-signatories’ investment is independent of the number of signatories and

equal to the investment corresponding to the fully non-cooperative equilibrium.
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6.3

The e¤ectiveness of an IRJV

Participation is a necessary condition for the successful of an IEA but it is not a su¢ cient
condition. The successful of an IEA must be assessed in terms of the reduction in costs
achieved by the agreement. As the “ideal” aim of an IEA should be to implement the
e¢ cient solution, the maximum reduction in costs that could be achieved by an agreement
is given by (28), the di¤erence in total costs between the fully non-cooperative equilibrium
and the e¢ cient solution. Then, the e¤ectiveness of an IRJV can be evaluated as the
percentage of this di¤erence that is achieved by the agreement. Thus, the …rst step to get
this evaluation is to calculate the reduction in total costs implemented by the agreement.
Using (15) and (41) the di¤erence in total costs can be written as
2 2

T Cinc

T Cis (n = N ) =

d
(2N
2r

1)(N 2

(1 + (N

1))2 );

as expected the gains coming from cooperation increase with the di¤erential technological
leakage and the marginal damages.
Using this expression, the e¤ectiveness of the agreement can be calculated dividing
by (28) that yields
T Cinc T Cis (n = N )
T Cinc T Cie
2
c(2N 1)(N 2 (1 + (N 1))2 )
:
=
r(N 1)2 + 2 c(N 4 (2N 1)(1 + (N 1))2 )
Then, the e¤ectiveness can be measured using an index
T Cinc T Cis (n = N )
T Cinc T Cie
so that the e¤ectiveness is maximum if

1

implicitly de…ned as follows

= 0; with

(42)

1

= 1:

Developing this di¤erence the following expression is obtained
2

c( (2N

1)N 2 N 4 (
1)(2N 1)(1 + (N 1))2 ) r(N
(r(N 1)2 + 2 c(N 4 (2N 1)(1 + (N 1))2 )

1)2

:

Thus, as the denominator is positive, a necessary condition to obtain a ratio equal to
zero is (2N

1)N 2

N 4 > 0 that yields a threshold value for

that allows to conclude that
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equal to N 2 =(2N

1)

Proposition 5 The e¤ectiveness of an IRJV decreases with the number of countries
involved in the environmental problem regardless of the marginal damages level and the
coalition information exchange.
The larger N; the larger

and the lower the gains coming from cooperation. For

instance, with N = 10; the di¤erence (42) can be zero only for values of

larger than 5.2

which means that the agreement can only achieve a reduction in total costs lower than
19% of the maximum reduction in total costs that could be reached through cooperation
regardless of the level of marginal damages and the di¤erential technological leakage. In
fact, in the numerical example studied in this section the grand coalition only achieves
18,7% of the total gains coming from cooperation. For N = 100; the threshold value for
is 50.25 and the reduction in costs that the grand coalition can implement is lower than
2%. Thus, sharing information between signatories does the grand coalition stable but
at the cost of a low e¤ectiveness.

7

Conclusions

This paper aims to study the e¤ects of R&D spillovers on the formation of IEAs by
solving a three-stage game where the membership decision is taken in the …rst stage,
the investment game is played in the second stage and the emission game is played in
the last stage. It is assumed that the marginal abatement costs of signatory countries
are decreased by the sum of signatories’R&D e¤orts in addition to some spillovers from
non-signatories’R&D whereas the marginal abatement costs of a non-signatory is only
a¤ected by its own investment and the spillover e¤ects of the rest of countries. We …nd
that for a R&D agreement the maximum participation consists of six countries and that
participation decreases as the coalition information exchange decreases until that a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached. Thus, sharing information
promotes cooperation but the e¤ects on participation are modest; the incentive the countries have to act as free riders in the provision of an (imperfect) public good practically
eliminates the positive e¤ects of the di¤erential technological leakage on participation.
On the other hand, we …nd that the grand coalition is stable if the countries sign an
32

international research joint venture that only obliges signatories to share information but
in this case the e¤ectiveness of the agreement is very low. Summarizing, our analysis
does not give reasons to think that technology agreements as those studied in this paper
could be a good alternative to international cooperation in emission abatement.
Some extensions of the model are on the agenda for future research. Primarily, the
corner solution of the game could be investigated. In this paper, we have obtained the
solution of the game with positive emissions what means that the focus has been on
mitigation. However, the model admits corner solutions or in other words, it admits the
possibility of GHG emissions being completely eliminated, that is, fossil fuels could be
completely eliminated adopting a breakthrough technology. In our model emissions can
become zero if a certain level of investment is reached. In this way, we would have a complete view of the possibilities that a R&D agreement has to promote more participation
in IEA. On the other hand, it is also clear that investment in R&D is a risky activity.
Thus, a natural extension of our analysis would be to think of some kind of probabilistic
model that implies that the investment in R&D can fail in bringing a cleaner technology.
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n

xfi

xsj

1 0:065

yif

yjs

0:211

T Cif

E

T Cjs

997:75 9:979

2 0:065 0:160 0:259

0:450 996: 90 9:970 9:975

3 0:065 0:285 0:376

0:969 994: 33 9:944 9:964

I 4 0:065 0:440 0:586

1:857

988:92 9:890 9:938

5 0:065 0:625 0:911

3:206

979:28 9:794 9:891

6 0:065 0:840 1:374

5:105

963:74 9:638 9:814

7 0:065 1:085 1:996

7:644

940:37 9:405 9:698

8 0:065 1:360 2:801 10:913

906:96 9:071 9:532

9 0:065 1:665 3:811 15:001

861:04 8:611 9:303

10

2:000

20:000

798:67

8:987

=1; =100; c=0:75; d=0:01; r=0:5; N =10

Table I. Numerical example with
n

xfi

xsj

1 0:024

yif

E

T Cif

999:57

9:996

999:24

9:993 9:994

yjs

0:030

= 0:25
T Cjs

2 0:024 0:088 0:033

0:181

3 0:024 0:190 0:042

0:576 997: 84 9:979 9:987

4 0:024 0:332 0:061

1:332

994:18

9:942 9:969

5 0:024 0:512 0:091

2:566

986:58

9:866 9:931

I 6 0:024 0:732 0:136

4:394

972:96

9:730 9:864

7 0:024 0:990 0:199

6:935

950:72

9:507 9:752

8 0:024 1:288 0:283 10:305

916:86

9:169 9:583

9 0:024 1:624 0:390 14:621

867:89

8:680 9:339

798:67

8:987

10

2:000

20:000

=1; =100; c=0:75; d=0:01; r=0:5; N =10

Table II. Numerical example with
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= 0:025

n

xfi

1

0:024

2

0:024 0:044 0:031 0:093

3

0:024 0:063 0:033 0:195 999: 06 9:9908 9:9916

4

0:024 0:083 0:036 0:337

998:31

9:9833 9:9848

5

0:024 0:102 0:040 0:515

997:09

9:9711 9:9736

6

0:024 0:122 0:045 0:734

995:28

9:9530 9:9566

7

0:024 0:141 0:050 0:992

992:77

9:9279 9:9327

8

0:024 0:161 0:057 1:289

989:44

9:8946 9:9009

9

0:024 0:180 0:065 1:625

985:18

9:8520 9:8599

979:87

9:8087

I 10

xsj

yif

yjs

0:030

0:200

2:000

E

T Cif

999:57

9:996

999:44

9:9946 9:9948

=1; =100; c=0:75; d=0:01; r=0:5; N =10

TABLE III. Numerical example with
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= 0:025:

T Cjs

